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Disputes about the nature, borders and rationales of academic disciplines have a history 
as long as the disciplines themselves. Views differ as to how far back the genealogy of 
today’s disciplines may most meaningfully be traced. The general consensus remains the 
mid-19th century, but a case for the ‘long’ 18th century can also be made (Valenza, 2009), 
with the late medieval university and the seven liberal arts (Kelley, 1997), or even the 
beginnings of the classical tradition – at least with respect to the humanities – being cited 
in reaction against excessively ‘discontinuous’ histories of thought and intellectual 
practices. Which option one finds most convincing will depend upon the formulation of 
the problem of disciplinarity, within the present, from which one sets out. Yet whichever 
genealogy one adopts, it is increasingly clear that the history of intellectual disciplines is 
longer, more differentiated and more ‘indisciplined’ than has conventionally been 
presented in the stories that disciplines have told about themselves (Graham et al, 1983; 
Schaffer, 2013). However indisciplined the disciplines may always have been, though, 
few would dispute the fact that there has been a qualitative shift in the character of 
debates about disciplinarity, in relations between academic disciplines, and within 
disciplines themselves in European and north American universities since the mid-1960s; 
or that these developments have been associated with the most creative and far-reaching 
transformations of intellectual practices in the natural sciences, the social sciences and 
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the humanities alike. Very few of the most important works in the area of ‘theory, 
culture and society’, for example, over the last 50 years, are 'disciplinary' in character, or 
representative of the disciplinary training of their authors. 
 Disciplinarity has become problematic in multiple and contested ways. What 
follows begins with a schematization of this process in terms of the multiplication of 
qualifying prefixes to which the term has been subjected in the course of these debates: 
inter-, multi-, trans-, de-, anti-, in-, meta- and post-. It proceeds – via a short history of 
transdisciplinarity, and an account of the distinctive conceptual structures produced by 
the transposition of the concept into the context of the humanities – to outline the two 
main and opposed philosophical traditions that have engaged with transdisciplinarity as 
the necessary consequence of the critique of philosophy itself. In each instance, it is 
attention to the practical bases of theoretical problems that leads to a transformation in 
disciplinary self-consciousness attendant upon transformations in the formulations of the 
problems themselves. The essays that follow in this special issue of Theory, Culture and 
Society reconstruct or represent the varying transdisciplinary problematics that structure 
the writings of a series of main figures in the structuralist, anti-dialectical and anti-
humanist strand of French thought: Serres, Foucault, Derrida, Althusser, Guattari and 
Latour. They are succeeded by three anglophone case studies of transdisciplinary 
relations: in Feminist Theory, Gender Studies and Psychosocial Studies. 
 
Disciplinarity and its prefixes 
The main change in the nexus of disciplines, since the 1960s, has involved an 
intensification of interest in, and a proliferation of proposals for, interdisciplinarity 
and multidisciplinarity, of various kinds. The first of these terms derives from the 
period between the World Wars (Stills, 1986: 17–18), the second from shortly after 
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the Second World War. Indeed, by 1939, ‘interdisciplinarity’ was apparently already 
being decried as ‘modish and passé’ (Schaffer, 2013: 60, citing Frank, 1988: 94) – as 
‘transdisciplinarity’ is now (Lawrence and Després, 2004: 397; Mittelstrass, 2011: 
329), despite the insistence on its ‘pristine charm’ (‘not yet corrupted by time’) by one 
of its main proponents, as recently as the mid-1990s (Nicolescu, 2002: 1). Since the 
1970s, the discourse of disciplines has become increasingly and successively 
differentiated and theoretically reflexive, with the introduction not only of the concept 
of transdisciplinarity – initially associated with the application of systems theory to 
educational policy and child development (Jantsch, 1970 and 1972; Piaget, 1972) – 
but also of anti-disciplinarity (associated with the academic radicalism of the 1980s – 
Mowitt, 1992), indisciplines (Mitchell, 1995 & 2009), antidisciplines (Pickering, 
1993 and 2013), postdisciplines – or at least, postdisciplinary academic practices 
(Messer-Davidow et al, 1993: 397–461; Nelson and Gaonkar, 1996b: 15) – and de-
disciplinarization (Prost, 2009: 749–50. Cf. Foucault, 1980: 39, quoted in Schaeffer, 
2013: 63).1  
 The prehistory of the project from which the essays in this volume are an 
outcome2 further contributed to this categorial proliferation with the addition of 
hegemonic disciplinarity (Osborne, 2011a). In the course of the project itself, 
however, we have come increasingly to think of meta-disciplinarity – understood as 
an overarching disciplinary function produced by the failure of certain supra-
disciplinary dynamics to escape the bordered and hierarchically organized intellectual 
forms of an academic discipline – as the main obstacle to the production of genuinely 
transdisciplinary conceptual constructions in the humanities.3 These are re-
disciplinarizing dynamics, which subject de-disciplinarizing initiatives to existing 
institutional and conceptual forms, respectively. ‘English’ (or in the USA, 
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Comparative Literature) and Geography are perhaps the best examples of the former, 
hegemonic form, incorporating whole hosts of new theoretical developments from 
without into radically expanded versions of their former selves. Structuralism is the 
exemplary case of the latter, insofar as it came to function as a ‘new transcendental 
philosophy’ (Deleuze, 2004: 174) and thereby, ultimately, restored in novel form 
precisely that theoretical primacy of philosophy over the sciences that it was initially 
pitted against. (Three of the articles in the current volume – Balibar, Cunningham, 
Alliez – address that issue directly.) 
 Two things in particular may be noted about this terminologically proliferating 
history of disciplinary self-reflections. First, there is a strong tendency in the use of 
these labels to produce a Whig historiography of disciplinarity, whereby historically 
successive forms appear necessarily superior to, or more progressive than, earlier 
ones, by virtue of the relative chronological closeness to the present of their moments 
of emergence and consolidation alone. The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity, 
for example, progresses from ‘Knowledge Interdisciplined’, via ‘Institutionalizing 
Interdisciplinarity’, to ‘Knowledge Transdisciplined’, as its concluding part 
(Frodeman, et al, 2010: Parts 3–5). ‘Institutionalizing Transdisciplinarity’ presumably 
being delegated to the avant-garde of handbooks of transdisciplinarity (such as 
Hadorn et al, 2008a). ‘Rethinking interdisciplinarity’ (Sperber, Nowotny et al, 2003–
4) over the last decade, at least in the sciences, has thus generally required some kind 
of engagement with the discourses and institutionalized frameworks of self-
consciously transdisciplinary research, even if only – like Barry and Born – to 
disavow the distinction in the act of acknowledging it.4 There is certainly a problem 
here, insofar as the historicist naturalization of the history of forms of disciplinarity 
overdetermines critical discourse in advance, bracketting off the possibility of a 
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critical approach to historical developments themselves. On the other hand, the weight 
of broader socio-economic and institutional determinations in the history of both 
academic disciplines and the debates about them – and there is a disjunction there – 
must be acknowledged, if an effective critical discourse about disciplinarity is to be 
produced. There is a tension here between sociological and epistemological 
perspectives, which is rarely confronted directly in the literature. 
 Nonetheless – and this is the second feature of the recent literature – there is a 
growing acknolwedgement of the internal complexity of the concept of an academic 
discipline, with often discrete intellectual, institutional and political aspects. It is 
useful at this point to recall something of the historical semantics of 'discipline'. 
Discipline (from the Latin, disciplina) pertains to the disciple: its context is the 
master/pupil relationship. 'Disciplines discipline disciples' (Barry and Born, 2013a: 1). 
Disciplines are institutional forms for the generational transmission of intellectual 
practices – traditions, handed down and also therefore, of course, betrayed. (Betrayal 
is one of the meanings of traditio.) In this respect, in the medieval university, 
discipline (as the practice of a disciple or scholar) was opposed to doctrine – or what 
we would now call 'theory' – which was the property of a doctor or teacher; although 
the two were nonetheless bound together, since it was doctrinal/theoretical content 
that the disciples/scholars studied and disseminated. (Cf. Post, 1999: 750–51, citing 
Shumway and Messer-Davidow, 1991: 202) This is not unconnected to the disruptive 
role played by ‘Theory’ in the transformation of disciplines in the Anglophone 
humanities and social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 This primary meaning of discipline as subjection to an authoritative set of 
practical norms, which impose order on the mind and body – and of self-discipline as 
the cultivation of habits and forms of care of the self (scholarship as a discipline of 
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the self) – is in tension with the more recent use of the term to refer to those 
departments of knowledge, academic subjects, methods and fields of study that 
became the basis of the departmental structure of the modern university (Appadurai, 
1996: 30–31).5 This departmental definition of disciplines according to subject matter 
and methods of study displaced the authority of the individual doctor, teacher or 
professor onto the rules governing the production, reproduction and socialization of 
knowledge: in particular, those of the professional association and the academic 
journal, which came, in turn, to regulate the market in academic jobs. (Post, 1999: 
752–5) In the process, the departmental conception of discipline introduced a 
disciplinary concept of research, which, from a semantic standpoint, contradictorily 
seeks theoretical innovation through disciplinary practices. This is an effect of the 
condensation of the production of doctrine/theory (construed now, on a natural-
scientific model as ‘research’) into an expanded conception of disciplines, within the 
Enlightenment conception of the university as a domain of free inquiry (Kant, 1996 
and 1979). Yet disciplinary structures play a relatively minor role in fundamental 
research in the natural sciences, where the general concept of ‘science’ (in its 
combined theoretical and experimental sense) and the pursuit of specific problems 
play the main role (Biagioli, 2009: 819–20; Mittelstrass, 2011: 330–31), often 
generating new disciplines. Indeed, it was precisely the generality of the concept of 
science, theoretically constituted via the philosophical sub-discipline of the 
epistemology of science, which was the motor of the transformation of a range of 
disciplines in the humanities and social sciences (‘the human sciences’) in France 
from the 1950s through to the 1970s, via the alternatively trans– and meta-
disciplinary (‘doctrinal’) concept of ‘structure’. Transposed into the context of the 
humanities and social studies, this concept of science posed new problems for 
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disciplinarity, to which Guattari’s development of a ‘French’ concept of 
‘transdisciplinarity as transversality’ was perhaps the most innovative response (see 
the text by Guattari, and the Introduction to it by Goffey, in this volume, below). The 
transformative dynamic of this concept of science – radicalized by its translation into 
an anglophone context to which it was initially quite ‘foreign’, and mediated by 
different national contexts – was then repeated in different ways in the anglophone 
humanities, from the 1970s onwards. 
 In the institutional context of the humanities, in universities structured by 
departments, ‘research’ is an ambiguous category, since it is at once opposed to and 
contains ‘scholarship’ in an unstable and untheorized manner.6 Research in the 
humanities, one might say, is a post-Enlightenment production of doctrine, 
contradictorily subject to, on the one hand, the relativity of belief necessary to free 
inquiry, and on the other, institutionalized forms of disciplinary procedures, to which 
it must simultaneously conform (in order to be recognized) and transgress, in order to 
be original or ‘innovative’ – hence, it must not transgress them too flagrantly. In this 
latter respect, disciplines function as constraints on research, as ‘limits to discovery’ 
(Mittelstrass, 2011: 330). Despite these contradictions, however, the departmental 
definition of the disciplines remains strong because the department is a highly 
effective self-reproducing institutional machine for training and hiring academics and 
providing the means of career advancement. Nonetheless, under conditions of 
increasing research intensity, there is an growing tension between the employment of 
academics and the organization of teaching in the disciplinary department, on the one 
hand, and the internal intellectual dictates, organization and funding of research, on 
the other.7 The primary disciplinary function of constraint appears to contradict the 
intellectual function of free inquiry on which the self-image of the modern research 
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university is based. Hence the rhetorical political progressivism of anti-, in-, de-, 
inter- and transdisciplinarities in academic politics since the 1960s, in which 
academic freedom functions metonymically for political freedom and the humanities 
have come to appear as the metonym for the liberal cultural function of the university 
itself. In Arjun Appadurai’s words:  
while many colleges and universities have increasingly become factories for 
specialized research, applied interest, and professional credializing, the 
humanities have become the critical site for the idea that the University is also 
about thought and reflection, cultivation and conscience, disinterest and 
abstraction, literacy and cosmopolitanism. (Appadurai, 1996: 27) 
 
And within the humanities, one might add, the inherent ‘uselessness’ or non-
‘vocational’ status of philosophy has made it the symbolic representative of the 
intellectual freedom of the humanities itself. (Non-vocational, that is, in the recent 
instrumental-economic sense of ‘vocation’, rather than in its original religious one.) 
 The practical humanism of this line of thought stands in uneasy relation to the 
anti-humanism of the theoretical resources with which it is often pursued – a gap over 
which a bridge named ‘Foucault’ is most frequently cast.8 But whatever one makes of 
that tension (and it can certainly be a productive one, as well as a source of 
incoherence), ‘indiscipline’ about disciplines has undoubtedly become a marker of the 
defence of the broader cultural function of universities – as well as a feature of 
advanced research organization – under the conditions of a departmentally structured 
disciplinary system that has remained largely unchanged for over a hundred years 
(Abbott, 2001: 122 – see also Becher 1989). Indeed, for some in the humanities there 
is a necessary relation between the two, embodied in a conception of cultural studies 
as involving ‘a deep concern with how objects, discourses and practices construct 
possibilities for and constraints on citizenship’, and a consequent commitment ‘to the 
ongoing critique of disciplinarity and to the redefinition and recombination of 
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disciplines in response to new or newly recognized historical realities’ (Nelson and 
Gaonkar, 1996b: 7, 14. See also, Hall, 1990). The emphasis on citizenship as the focal 
point of political concern comes out of the North American context, although one can 
imagine a possible European equivalent (Balibar, 2004); a UK one is harder to 
invisage. It has the virtue of drawing attention to the fact that any such political-
intellectual project of ongoing disciplinary critique and reorganization ‘violates… the 
unwritten and unsigned pact post World War II disciplines made with state power’ in 
the USA (Nelson and Gaonkar, 1996b: 2), and with US foreign policy in particular. 
When it comes to the supra-disciplinary dynamics of the organization of research, the 
question of the state and the political rationale of research cannot be avoided. 
  It is in order to escape the constraints of disciplines on research, as ‘limits to 
discovery’, rather than as limits to freedom, that research has de facto increasingly 
become organized in supradisciplinary and often periodically organized project-based 
centres, and especially, more recently, in policy-based, transnational, multi- and 
aspiringly transdisciplinary research organizations. It is in this context that the 
concept of transdisciplinarity emerged and developed, as a product of methodological 
self-reflection on new research processes. Before we come to the rather different 
approach to the concept of transdisciplinarity represented by the essays in this 
volume, it will be useful to schematize the main stages of the established history of 
the concept to date. 
 
Transdisciplinarity: A brief history 
In the course of its short, less-than-fifty-year history, we can trace three main and two 
secondary discourses about transdisciplinarity in the sciences. The main ones are: (i) a 
systems-theoretical approach to producing ‘an integral education/innovation system’ 
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(Jantsch 1970: 7; Kim, 1998; Somerville and Rapport, 2000); (ii) a sociological 
science-policy approach to new forms of knowledge production (Gibbons et al, 1994; 
Nowotny et al, 2001; Nowotny, 2003); and (iii) a literature about research 
methodology in the collaborative solution of ‘life-world’ problems of environmental 
sustainability and health (Thompson Klein, 2001; Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn, 2007; 
Hirsch Hadorn et al, 2008), of which Guattari’s transdisciplinary initiatives may be 
considered a deviant forerunner (Goffey, below ???): The secondary discourses are: 
(iv) a cosmological conception of transdisciplinary knowledge, based on a notion of 
‘levels of reality’ derived from quantum physics (Nicolescu, 2002 and 2008); and (v) 
a periodizing discourse in the philosophy of science, which is in various respects also 
postdisciplinary (Balsiger, 2004; Biagioli, 2009; Mittelstrass, 2011 – see also 
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). 
 All of these discourses are historically, and especially institutionally, closely 
related, but they nonetheless have distinct intellectual distinct profiles. It was the 
passing institutional dominance of the fourth, cosmological conception from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, as a result of UNESCO’s co-sponsoring of large international 
events with Nicolescu’s Centre International de Recherches et Études 
Transdisciplinaires (CIRET), leading to the First World Congress in 
Transdisciplinarity in 1994, for example, that to a significant extent discredited the 
concept of transdisciplinarity within science studies, as tending towards a mytho-
poetic discourse on the unity of nature. In fact, sponsorship by large international 
organizations has been central to the propagation of the discourse of 
transdisciplinarity from the outset (its ‘founding’ moment in the OECD meeting in 
Nice in 1970), and in the late 1990s Yersu Kim, Director of the Division of 
Philosophy and Ethics at UNESCO, went so far as to declare UNESCO itself ‘a 
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transdisciplinary organization’ (Kim, 1998: 3). This highlights the policy-based 
managerial imperative behind the aspiration for the production of new forms of 
integral knowledge (Somerville and Rapport, 2000), and the dangers of overly 
abstract, typological epistemological classifications and models, along with 
insufficiently politically examined practical presuppositions. These are certainly 
weaknesses from which the literature suffers, as a whole, but especially in its more 
programmatical declarations. (The International Congresses of Transdisciplinarity are 
prone to concluding Declarations.) It was not until Gibbons et al’s 1994 The New 
Production of Knowledge that the concept of transdisciplinarity acquired a more 
concrete, conceptually and empirically grounded historical status as a constitutent 
element in what they called ‘Mode 2 Knowledge Production’.  
 Whereas the systems-theoretical literature on transdisciplinarity tends towards 
a meta-disciplinary form of supra-disciplinarity, embodied in the idea of ‘a common 
system of axioms for a set of disciplines’ (the generic definition adopted by the First 
OECD International Conference on Interdisciplinary Research and Education), the 
second main discourse, the sociological literature in science policy, focuses on large-
scale social problems – mainly generated by environmental factors associated with 
globalization – viewed as amenable to scientific solutions. The specifically 
‘transdisciplinary’ aspect of the research process here derives from its basis in 
problems that are initially identified and formulated externally to the scientific 
process itself and cannot be adequately addressed by disciplinary knowledges, their 
simple combination in multi-disciplinary units, or interdisciplinary interactions (see 
Hirsch Hadorn et al, 2008b). Transdisciplinarity is thus associated here – and this is 
the core of its dominant institutional reality – with a form of knowledge production 
that has its basis in broader social processes to which it is ultimately responsible, and 
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from which it cannot ultimately be disengaged. This is a specifically European 
conception to the extent to which it has as its historical presupposition a certain kind 
of social-democratic, ‘educational’ welfare state, of which it represents a technocratic 
variant. Whereas the systems-theoretical version of transdisciplinarity, and its 
cosmological (spiritual and ethicist) variant, is institutionally associated with 
UNESCO, the sociological-science-policy version is associated with European Union 
science policy, and the European Research Council in particular (Helga Nowotny was 
the President of the European Research Council [ERC], 2010–2013); along with the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (which sponsors a Swiss Transdisciplinarity 
Award) and the Swiss Academy of Arts and Sciences (Thompson Klein et al, 2001; 
Pohl et al, 2007).9  
 Transdisciplinarity is sometimes treated as if it is simply the same thing as 
Mode 2 Knowledge Production, but it is actually only one of the latter’s five main 
features; albeit a result of its first distinguishing characteristic: namely, that this is a 
form of knowledge that is produced in contexts of application, and therefore cannot 
be classified according to a distinction between basic and applied research, where 
‘basic’ research is understood (perhaps erroneously) to be disciplinary in orientation.  
As a result, such knowledge is taken to be ‘heterogenous’ in its institutional origins, 
and to involve a multiplicity of social actors beyond universities (private corporations, 
think-tanks, hospitals, charities, etc). Fourth, such knowledge is consequently 
understood to be reflexive with regard to social accountability (tracable back to its 
starting point in societal needs and the multiplicity of its social ‘stakeholders’). 
Hence, finally, it is subject to novel types of quality control, involving extra-
scientific, social criteria, including public participation. This is very much a 
speculative extrapolation of a tendentially emerging sociology of technoscience, with 
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a strongly prescriptive social-democratic content, ideologically standing out against – 
while nonetheless practically mediating – the neo-liberal corporate tide of the 1990s. 
It is addressed to governments, supra-national research organizations and the general 
public, and proposes a vision of society (‘the knowledge society’) as much as, if not 
more than, of science itself. This latter aspect was extended in the subsequent volume 
Re-thinking Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty, which sets 
out from the thesis of the ‘scientification of society’. Central to this notion is the idea 
(borrowed from Bruno Latour) of a transition from a ‘culture of science’ to a ‘culture 
of research’, in which ‘Science is certainty; research is uncertainty’. (Nowotny et al, 
2001: 2–3). This polemical distinction between ‘science’ and ‘research’, presaging a 
new conception of ‘science as research’ leads into the third, most recent main 
discourse on transdisciplinarity, which focuses on the detailed methodologies of 
collaborative research in solving both fundamental intra-scientific problems (Biagioli, 
2009; Mittelstrass, 2011) and ‘life-world’ societal problems, largely to do with 
environmental sustainability and health. It is in line here with the trajectory of 
development theory itself. By the 1990s, the post-World War II development 
paradigm of modernization theory (closely tied to postwar US foreign policy) had 
begun to be displaced (or at least accompanied) within international organizations by 
a human rights-based concept of ‘sustainable development’.  
 This practically orientated literature – of which the Guattari–Latour line is a 
more philosophically reflective, hyper-theoretical version (see Alliez, in this volume, 
below) – is primarily made up of methodological reflection on detailed 
transdisciplinary case studies; and it is related to the secondary, periodizing discourse 
in the philosophy of science (the last of the five established discourses on 
transdisciplinarity idientified here). This discourse within the philosophy of science 
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has two main components: first, a framing emphasis on the non-disciplinary and 
problem-based character of the concept of science; and second, a strong sense of the 
redundancy of the Kuhnian concept of a paradigm, and hence of the idea of ‘normal 
science’ of which it is a part. The stress on research process is in line with a shift 
within the philosophy of science away from Kuhn’s dualism of revolutionary and 
normal science, towards Lakatos’s concept of research programmes (Lakatos and 
Musgrave, 1970); while the sense of contextual contingency and methodological 
flexibility aligns transdisciplinary practices with the methodological ‘anarchism’ of 
Feyeraband’s ‘anything goes’ (Balsiger, 2004; Feyeraband, 1978a and 1978b). More 
closely connected to the transdisciplinary problematic itself is the concept of ‘post-
normal science’ developed by Funtowicz and Ravetz in the context of ecological 
economics, which centres on conditions of ‘system uncertainty’ and the notion of high 
‘decision stakes’, which require ‘extended peer communities’. The crossing of 
disciplinary boundaries is construed within this literature less in terms of specific sets 
of transformative or constructive exchanges, than as a dissolution of disciplinary 
frameworks as such. Ironically, it is precisely this conception of a dissolution of 
existing disciplinary frameworks that raises the spectre of re-disciplinarization via the 
new ‘discipline’ (in its original sense) of a methodologically standardized 
transdisciplinarity. 
 Concentration on these more concrete aspects of policy-orientated 
collaborative research processes, in a greater variety of contexts, has disengaged the 
concept of transdisciplinarity from any necessary relationship to the other features of 
Mode 2 Knowledge Production, and made it a self-contained methodological topic.10 
And there is a large and still growing, increasingly detailed literature about it in 
journals such as Science and Public Policy, Research Policy, Higher Education and 
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Futures. The general framework of these debates, however, continues to be something 
like a more generic and less politicized version of Mode 2 Knowledge Production 
(see, for example, Russell et al, 2008), with contributors making more fine-grained 
distinctions only within particular areas (see, for example, Mobjörk, 2010; Jahn et al, 
2012). The overwhelmingly common feature, both epistemologically and politically, 
is an instrumental, technocratic humanism.  
 The concept of problem-solving upon which this emergent conceptual 
consensus is based centres upon policy-based reformulations of life-world problems, 
which are construed in such a way as to be amenable to technological and other 
instrumental solutions (cf. Osborne, 2011a: 16) The established discourse of 
transdisciplinarity is thus overwhelmingly positive and organizational; it a discourse 
of the state, albeit often in practice of state-like entities on a supranational scale, 
which lack the means of programmatic enforcement of the classical nation-state. It 
nonetheless presumes state agency, or at least state-stimulated agency, as the bearer of 
its practical rationality. In this respect, it has lost the more radical socio-political 
content associated with many of the interdisciplinary initiatives in the 1970s and 80s. 
In particular, it requires that one imagine as the agency of science policy a ‘better’, 
educational, social-democratic welfare state. In reality, however, European states are 
in the process of disimbursing themselves of a variety of knowledge-producing and 
educational functions (this is the neo-liberal aspect of ‘heterogeneity’), in the name of 
getting closer to ‘worldly’ problems. ('The world has problems, but universities have 
departments’, in Brewer’s much-quoted phrase – Brewer, 1999: 328). Nonetheless, at 
the same time, these states want to maintain control over the form of the process of 
disimbursement, a form of control that is still legitimized, classically, via the notion 
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of ‘the public interest’ (this is their residual statist aspect: neo-liberal statism) – a 
public interest that the state nonetheless declares itself impotent to fulfill.  
 It is interesting in this regard that when Hessels et al did a quantitative 
citational analysis of seven diagnoses of the current state of scientific knowledge 
production offering themselves as alternatives to the framework of Mode 2 
Knowledge Production, the most cited was that of ‘academic capitalism’ (Hessels et 
al, 2008: 743 – the emblematic text was Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). This directly 
contradicts the optimistic democratic-statist presentation of the normative dimension 
of public scientific accountability in much recent literature on transdisciplinarity, 
which projects a passing beyond consultation, towards local participation in problem 
definition. Such discourses tend to abstract from both the politics and the historical 
context of problem definitions, in favour of idealized democratic models, supported 
by a small number of highly localized (and dubiously generalizable) examples. This is 
related to an almost complete lack of fundamental theoretical work on the concept of 
a problem. Is a problem something that requires the positing of practical solutions, or 
is a problem, primarily, something that defines a shared field of inquiry (a 
problematic), the investigation of which may take radically unexpected turns, leading 
to a reproblematization – critical or otherwsie – of the original issue?11 This lack of 
theoretical work on the concept of a problem is a symptom of an exclusive focus on 
knowledge production as ‘research process’ to the neglect of concepts: concept 
construction and theory construction. The established literature on transdisciplinarity 
lacks an account of the internal dynamics of specifically transdisciplinary concepts – 
or concepts in their transdisciplinary functioning – beyond the idea that they address 
problems rather than disciplinary objects. And it is has no developed concept of a 
problem. Ironically, it thus shows little interest in how concepts with sufficient 
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generality to address basic societal problems actually function transdisciplinarily 
‘across’ the disciplinary terrains from which they draw, linking the discourses of 
different disciplines together through non-disciplinary problems, and transforming the 
meaning of their basic concepts, in a manner quite different from any merely 
interdisciplinary engagements.  
   
Transdisciplinarity and the humanities 
The project of which this volume is a part takes a different approach to 
transdisciplinarity, in several respects.  First, it sets out from a different starting place: 
those theoretical developments in the anglophone humanities since the 1970s that are 
based in the reception of the French and German theory of the 1960s and after. These 
are theoretical forms, we propose, that are in one way or another transdisciplinary in 
character. The great books of European theory in the second half of the twentieth 
century all exhibit hitherto unexamined transdisciplinary conceptual dynamics. 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947, Beauvoir’s The Second 
Sex (1949), Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), Levi-Strauss’s The Savage 
Mind (1962), Foucault’s Words and Things (1966 – translated as The Order of 
Things), Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1967), Deleuze and Guattari’s two-volume 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972; 1980), Habermas’s Theory of Communicative 
Action (1981) and Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason (1983) – to name only a 
selection – are books that cross disciplines with a confidence and facility that belie the 
complexity of the exchanges between the different knowledges out of which they are 
constructed, in widely differing and often unstated ways. (Cf. Osborne 2011a: 15) 
Nearly all of these texts either predate the established discourse on transdisciplinarity, 
with its myth of origin in Nice in 1970, or were produced independently of it, 
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although the questioning of disciplinarity was very much a part of their theoretical 
self-consciousnesses. Meanwhile, their anglophone reception took place in a series of 
disciplinarily specific contexts (especially literary studies), which, while they 
acknowledged – indeed, sought out – the disciplinarily disruptive and transformative 
forces of these texts, was nonetheless largely unconcerned to theorize these 
disciplinary dynamics, immanently, other than in terms of a libertarian anti-
disciplinarianism, for which the simple word ‘theory’ was the marker. (Mowitt, 1992; 
Cusset, 2008; Osborne, 2011b: 19–26)  
 The disciplinarily specific dynamics of the radical theoretical generalities of 
these texts was thus obscured. In retrospect, however, this unconsciousness of the 
transdisciplinary structures of ‘theory’ may be seen to have played a crucial role in 
the transnationalization of intellectual traditions in Europe and beyond, since it 
facilitated its translational role in the relative de-nationalization of what Derrida 
called ‘philosophical nationalities’ (Derrida, 1982: 111. See also Derrida 2004: 1–80). 
‘Theory’, we might say, was the unconscious historical anticipation of the effect of 
globalization on intellectual life. National intellectual cultures, today, are post-
national articulations of specific transnationalizing transdisciplinarities; hence the 
reactive ideological fervour of nationalisms, political and intellectual (cf. Osborne and 
Alliez, 2013: 8).12 
 Gibbons et al’s The New Production of Knowledge addresses ‘The Case of the 
Humanities’ in chapter 4. It is claimed there not only that ‘many of the developments 
of Mode 2 can also be found in the humanities’, but that they are ‘perhaps more 
typical of the traditional humanites than they are of the natural and many of the social 
sciences’. Indeed, they claim, transdisciplinarity, in particular, is ‘endemic’. (Gibbons 
et al, 1994: 90–93, emphasis added) These claims place the humanities at the 
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forefront of Mode 2 Knowledge Production, despite their more or less complete 
absence from the literature, other than in this short and highly schematic overview 
itself.13 However, on closer examination they are less than convincing. This is, first, 
because the humanities are taken to be largely only ‘serendipitously’ Mode 2, on the 
grounds that their historical ‘resistance to scientification’ (Romanticism) was a 
resistance to Mode 1 knowledge production in the sciences. Secondly, ‘the shape of 
trandisciplinarity’ here is taken to be no more than a ‘growing fuzziness of 
disciplinary boundaries’. Yet as is well known, recognition of the fuzziness of 
boundaries is an effect of precisely the kind of over-rigid and hierarchical 
‘disciplinary boundary work’, that is a primary characteristic of Mode 1 knowledge 
production (Gibbons et al, 1994: 93, 106). The reduction of transdisciplinarity to 
‘fuzziness’ of disciplinary boundaries is a serious intellectual collapse. As the 
reference to the ‘traditional’ humanities shows, along with the corresponding 
emphasis on the hermeneutical issues of ‘contextualization and meaning’, no account 
is taken here of the fundamental transformations in the anglophone humanities since 
the 1970s; of their theoretical and purportedly ‘scientific’ nature; or of their sources in 
French and German philosophy and critical theory. Yet it is precisely these 
developments that introduced radical forms of transdisciplinary conceptual 
functioning into the humanities.  
 Prior to these developments, and the Humanities Centres in research 
universities in the USA to which they gave rise, along with the emergence and 
disciplinary dissemination of cultural studies in the UK, USA and Australia, there had 
been little theoretical debate in the English-speaking world about the unity or 
epistemological basis of the disciplines that had made up humanities’ faculties since 
the founding of modern universities in the mid- to late-19th century. This unity had 
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largely evolved empirically, taking the form of a series of modifications and additions 
to the Renaissance studia humanitatis, out of which, after Romanticism, ‘history’ and 
‘literature’ emerged to become the dominant disciplines in the 20th-century 
humanities, displacing classics, law and an English-language philosophy that, in the 
course of the 20th century, largely retreated into a self-imposed analytical isolation.14  
 In methodological terms, the unity of humanities’ disciplines was largely a 
negative one, deriving from their mutual difference from the experimentally defined 
natural sciences. The underlying positive correlate of this distinction in a difference 
between the natural and the human, with its (displaced theological) roots in 
Renaissance humanism, was given a transcendental legitimation in Germany in late 
19th century neo-Kantianism, in the difference between the Marburg and ‘southwest’ 
or Baden Schools, and in Dilthey’s notion of the Geisteswissenschaften – a term he 
popularized, and a notion with which he is associated, but which was orginally coined 
to translate the ‘moral sciences’ of David Hume and J. S. Mill (a rarely acknowledged 
lineage) into German. In the intellectual culture of British empiricism, the distinction 
tended to be simply taken for granted, whether celebrated (Matthew Arnold) or 
bemoaned (C. P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’). In this respect, it is ironic that it was 
primarily a French structuralist ‘anti-humanist’ conception of the human sciences that 
revivified the anglophone ‘humanities’. The contradictory convergence of this anti-
humanist movement with the introduction of an anthropological conception of culture 
into literary studies in the Hogart/Williams strand of cultural studies in Britain was 
subsequently mediated by the critical transformation and ‘post-humanist’ extension of 
anthropology itself, including crucially, empirically, into Science Studies. 
Latourian/Callonian actor-network theory is the end product of that trajectory (see 
Latour, 2005).15 
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 What is usually meant by the ‘anglophone humanities since the 1960s’ is a 
disciplinary matrix that is unified by the incorporation through translation of 
European – predominantly French – theoretical texts. And the main manner in which 
its previous disciplinary formation was problematized, at a structural level, was via a 
new generic notion of ‘science’, and its critical aftermath (often misleadingly labeled 
‘poststructuralism’), in particular. While in Germany, the broadly overlapping 
Geisteswissenschaften and Kulturwissenschaften (the term preferred by the southwest 
neo-Kantians) were considered to be methodologically distinct from the natural 
sciences by virtue of the transcendental constitution of their object domains, both 
Hume’s conception of ‘moral sciences’ (such as Adam Smith’s political economy) 
and Comte’s positive social philosophy modelled themselves, methodologically, on 
the natural sciences – despite the culmination of Comte’s thought in a ‘religion of 
humanity’. In this respect, it has always been a function of the social or human 
sciences in Britain and France to act as a problematizing go-between, between the 
humanities and modern concepts of science. Whilst initially the social sciences tended 
to be located within the humanities, differentiated there from ‘the arts’, they have 
become increasingly independent, especially in the eyes of research councils, despite 
the continuing uncertainty about their epistemological status. (Philosophy of the 
social sciences hardly exists as a subdiscipline of the philosophy of science, these 
days – an effect, perhaps, of its previous connections to the Marxist tradition.) In this 
respect, there is actually a much closer affinity between French ‘theory’ and Anglo-
American scientific and technological intellectual culture, than there is between the 
latter and the formation of German Critical Theory and literary criticism out of the 
fragments of Marxism and its German idealist and Romantic philosophical ancestors.  
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 Given the prioritization accorded to problem-definition in contexts of 
application within the model of Mode 2 knowledge production, one might have 
expected its approach to the humanities to have included more of an account of the 
way in which the life-world gives rise to humanities-specific problems, beyond those 
general questions of meaning and communication associated with the classical role of 
the humanities in the cultivation of the liberal self. To do that, however, would require 
stepping down from the standpoint of the state, conceived as the technocratic political 
representative of a national segment of humanity, to raise more political questions 
about different social subject positions, their competing socio-economic and cultural 
needs, and the forms of knowledge production associated with them – including the 
desire for freedom at a collective as well as an individual level.  It is in this context 
that Guattari’s writing on transdisciplinarity appears as something like a more 
radically social and political, ontologized version of the established discourse, which, 
furthermore, it largely anticipated.  
 The Introduction to the dossier on ‘Trandisciplinarity in French Thought’ that 
functioned as the pilot for the project of which this volume is a part opened with the 
confident declaration: ‘The concept of transdisciplinarity is not part of the explicit 
discourse or self-consciousness of “French thought”’ (Osborne, 2011a: 15; emphasis 
added). So we believed at the time. Subsequent investigation has revealed this to be a 
partial truth, at best. Philologically, we find the term in the work of both Michel 
Serres and Félix Guattari – samples of which we translate here (Serres, 1974; 
Guattari, 1991) – and it is in no way a merely philological occurrence. Guattari had 
begun to apply the principle of transversality to the relationship between disciplinary 
knowledges as early as 1965 in his organizational work with the Federation of 
Institutional Study Groups and Research (FGERI) and the Centre for Institutional 
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Study, Research and Training (CERFI). And the FGERI’s journal, Recherches, 
founded in January 1966, explicitly promoted a radically cross-disciplinary 
programme (Dosse, 2010: 76–79). In fact, François Dosse recounts Jean Oury, the 
psychoanalyst and mentor to Guattari, telling him that François Tosquelles, the 
Catalan psychiatrist, ‘talked about… transdisciplinarity’ in the context of their early 
development of institutional analysis at the Saumery clinic between 1949 and 1953 
(Dosse, 2010: 43) – although it seems highly unlikely that the term itself was used at 
that time. (There is no evidence of which I know that it was.) Nonetheless, there is a 
clear conceptually transdisciplinary trajectory there, running from the La Bordean 
institutional analysis of the mid 1960s, via the Institut Polytechnique de Philosophie 
at the University of Paris 8 (Vincennes) – a Philosophy department that was 
effectively constituted as a part of left politics – to that undoubtedly transdisciplinary 
text, Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972; 1980) and beyond. And it involved a quite 
different politics from the technocratic social democracy of the more recent, 
established conception: a post-Trotskyist, anti-authoritarian communist politics of 
groups, from the Left Opposition in France in the mid-1960s to the post-autonomia of 
the 1990s. This is a radical post-Sartrean version of the transdisciplinary implications 
of Marx’s critique of philosophy, routed through the organizational analysis of 
institutional psychotherapy. This leads to the second of the main differences from 
established discourses of transdisciplinarity of the approach adopted in this project: 
the centrality of the question of the relationship of transdisciplinarity to philosophy, 
and the philosophical critique of disciplinary philosophy, in particular.  
 
Transdisciplinarity and the critique of philosophy 
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If the literature on the mutual dependence of academic disciplines – beyond the 
hierarchical modeling of the structure of the university into faculties – only begins in 
earnest in the interwar period (1918–1939), in the wake of the founding of modern 
research universities and the critique of specialization, one powerful model of these 
relations nonetheless dates back to the early 19th century: the dialectical model of 
interdisciplinary research, which has its source in Hegel’s idea of an Encyclopedia of 
Philosophical Sciences. When Max Horkheimer took over the directorship of the 
Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in 1931, his inaugural address characterized 
‘the current intellectual situation’ as one in which ‘traditional disciplinary boundaries 
have been called into question and will remain unclear for the foreseeable future.’ His 
response was to take up once again the task of Hegelian philosophy as modified by 
Marx’s critique of Hegel – that is to say, by the critique of any independent or ‘self-
sufficient’ (selbstständlich) philosophy – and transform it into the research agenda of 
an interdisciplinary materialism, the ‘ultimate aim’ of which was ‘the interpretation of 
the vicissitudes of human fate – the fate of humans not as mere indiviudals… but as 
members of a community.’ The task, in other words, was to ‘put a large empirical 
research apparatus in the service of socio-philosophical problems.’ (Horkheimer, 
1993: 1, 10.)16 The dialectical – that is to say, totalizing – form of presentation of the 
results of this interdisciplinary research appears here as itself the dialectical product 
of the critique of the idealism of philosophy as such. In Marx and Engels words, in 
The German Ideology: 
 When reality is depicted, philosophy as a self-sufficient (selbstständlich) 
branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence. At its best its place can 
only be taken by a summing up of the most general results, abstractions that 
arise from the observation of the historical development of men and women. 
Viewed apart from real history, these abstractions have in themselves no value 
whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical 
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material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. … our difficulties 
begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement – the real 
depiction – of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or of the 
present. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises… which 
only the study of the actual life-process and the activities of the individuals of 
each epoch will make evident. (Marx and Engels, 1970: 48, translation 
amended) 
 
  Marx and Engels famously left undetermined here the method of ‘summing 
up the results’, but Marx’s own subsequent ‘study of the actual life-process and the 
activities of the individuals’ of capitalist societies, in Capital, authorized 
Horkheimer’s modified – historically open-ended – return to a dialectical form of 
presentation: ‘a continuous, dialectical penetration and development of philosophical 
theory and specialized scientific praxis.’ ‘Philosophical theory’ here means both the 
reflective articulation of concepts constituted at the highest level of abstraction (‘the 
most general results’) and the formulation of questions corresponding to that level of 
abstraction: that is to say, the level of the social, and ultimately, the historical ‘whole’.  
the question today is to organize investigations stimulated by contemporary 
philosophical problems in which philosophers, sociologists, economists, 
historians, and psychologists are brought together in permanent 
collaboration… 
These questions will not be definitively answered, as such, rather: ‘these questions 
themselves become integrated into the empirical research process; their answers lie in 
the advance of objective knowledge, which itself affects the form of the questions.’ 
(Horkheimer, 1993: 9–10) In other words, there is a reflexively iterative process of 
problem definition, investigation and reformulation, very much like that which 
structures today’s self-consciously transdiscipinary research.17 Retrospectively, this is 
a transdisciplinary, as well as a multi- and interdisciplinary research agenda (all 
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transdisciplinary research involves certain elements of multi- and interdisciplinary 
research) precisely because of the role of ‘philosophical theory’ in constituting the 
most general concepts, to which the most general social and historical problems – the 
pragmatic basis of the research agenda in social needs – correspond. This 
‘philosophical theory’ (which is itself an interesting phrase) is not part of a 
disciplinary, in the sense of an autonomous or self-sufficient, philosophy. Philosophy 
may ‘live on because the moment to realize it was missed’, as the famous opening 
line of Negative Dialectics has it (Adorno, 1973: 3), but it cannot live on in a purely 
or a strictly (‘self-sufficiently’) philosophical form. Nor, one might add, can it live on 
in a purely negative form either, without being reduced to the mere shadow of a false 
self-sufficiency. Rather, here it becomes the conceptual medium of transdisciplinarity, 
using the materials of the philosophical tradition as conceptual resources for 
transdisciplinary constructions. Transdisciplinary concept-construction is a post- and 
proto-philosophical activity, in the wake of the critique of disciplinary philosophy’s 
false self-sufficiency. On the model of Marx’s critique of political economy, it gives 
socio-historical meaning to idealizing, abstract social forms of universality that were 
previously misrecognized as purely philosophical concepts: ‘subject’ and ‘person’ for 
example, the meaning of the generality of which must be produced trandisciplinarily, 
across the domains of philosophy, economics, law, anthropology, religious studies 
and psychoanalysis – to name only the main disciplinary instances. Transdisciplinary 
concepts acquire a philosophical appearance as the developing theoretical generality 
produced by their cross-disciplinary functioning approaches a total disciplinary 
universality; philosophical concepts acquire a transdisciplinary actuality to the extent 
that their empirical interpretation crosses a multiplicity of disciplines in a manner that 
reconstitutes them, as the relational product of these crossings.18  
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 The main differences of Horkheimer’s early project from current discourses of 
transdisciplinarity concern the central articulating role of ‘philosophical theory’ and 
the location of the social – and hence ‘problems’ – within the historical, 
philosophically construed. Established discourses of transdisciplinarity show little 
interest in questions of concept constitution, conceptual relations and conceptual 
critique. Rather, they displace relational issues onto questions about the 
organizational form of the research process. On the other hand, in its materialist post-
Hegelian role, dialectical logic is presented by Horkheimer as functioning as a kind of 
neutral medium of ‘general scientificity’ (there are shades of ‘systems theory’ here). 
Yet the totalizing project – however open-ended, and especially in its historical form 
– carries with it philosophical presuppositions of its own, which have to be 
argumentatively redeemed, in relation to the ongoing transdisciplinary totalization of 
knowledges itself. This is not the kind of argument that today’s transdisciplinary 
researchers are likely to engage in, since it goes beyond the empirical criteria required 
by their model of knowledge. It was, however, the main point of contention in the 
argument between Sartre’s existential post-Hegelianism and structuralism in postwar 
French thought. Structuralism appears there as a new and non-dialectical model of 
general scientificity. In the structuralist displacement of materialist and existential 
Hegelianisms, the same set of problems about disciplinarity appears in a new form. 
Structuralism implicitly aspires to the status of a transdisciplinary discourse (call it 
‘science’), yet, even more perhaps than Horkheimer’s ‘philosophical theory’, it faces 
the danger of performing a meta-disciplinary role, which is indifferent to the 
specificities of the disciplines it crosses. This is the famous role of structuralism as a 
‘new transcendental philosophy’ (Deleuze, 2004: 174) or even ultimately a new 
rationalist metaphysics (Badiou).  
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 This danger can be countered only by a strict immanence in the construal of 
the ‘trans-’ (the movement across disciplines), whether this immanence be historical 
(in a capital-logic version of post-Hegelianism, perhaps) or that of the synchronic 
naturalization of transversality in a Guattarian, post-structuralist, anti-dialectical 
version – in which Sartre’s temporalization/de-temporalization/re-temporalization is 
replaced by the topological spatiality of territorialization/de-territorialization/re-
territorialization. Such immanence means that concepts are retrospectively, artificially 
and temporarily grasped in their unity, qua concepts. The problem of what appears as 
a strictly philosophical – meaning a ‘purely’ conceptual – universality thus cannot be 
dissolved empirically, but is rather re-posed and rendered more complicated. 
 This is a post-structuralist model of transdisciplinarity that did not emerge 
directly out of the critique of philosophy as such, but rather out of the critique of the 
re-transcendentalization of the concept of structure. In the particular case of Guattari, 
it appears as the immanently philosophical dimension of a social critique of the 
Lacanian psychoanalytical problematic. It is thus to a great extent free of the 
repetitive structure of the ‘German’ problem of philosophy’s dialectical relations to its 
non-philosophical others. Here, it seems, these relations can be theorized without 
privileging the standpoint of the philosophy that has been left behind (see Alliez, 
2011). This is a great philosophical advantage. 
 An approach to transdisciplinarity from the standpoint of the theoretical 
transformations of the anglophone humanities by variants of French and German 
theory thus offers us two basic transdisciplinary problematics: dialectical and anti-
dialectical. It is some of the conceptual resources of the structural, anti-dialectical, 




We set out, surprisingly perhaps, from Michel Serres. The early, broadly structuralist 
work of Michel Serres remains largely unknown in English. Yet, as Lucie Mercier 
explains in the Introduction to her translation of his text here, Serres produced a 
philosophical reinterpretation of structuralism, by cross-reading it with Leibniz’s 
metaphysical system, that is so theoretically innovative as to contain a multiplicity of 
discrete philosophical trajectories, within its system of sytematicities. It is the radical 
relationality of this project that makes it structurally transdisciplinary: both at the 
level of Serres’s constructive translational practice (as read by Mercier) and within it, 
in his construal of transdisciplinarity as ‘relative exteriority’, in the passage translated 
here. It is the pre-disciplinary character of Leibniz’s work, perhaps, that renders its 
transposition into the disciplinary networks of structuralism so radically 
transdisciplinary.19 
 Serres’s attempt at a Leibnizian metaphysical totalization and transformation 
of the field of structuralism throws an illuminating retrospective light on the 
disciplinary dynamics at work (and play) in both Foucault’s and Derrida’s attempts in 
the mid 1960s to forge theoretical frameworks that would retain something of the 
post-philosophical generality of the structuralist problematic while avoiding falling 
back into becoming a ‘new transcendental philosophy’. Here, Étienne Balibar and 
David Cunningham examine the different quasi-transcendental logics of 
generalization in Foucault’s concept of the episteme and Derrida’s concept of writing, 
respectively – with regard to their undoubtedly transdisciplinary dynamics. Nina 
Power explores the converse idea to Cunningham’s transdisciplinary interpretation of 
Derrida’s concept of writing, and indeed of philosophy itself: the idea of reading 
transdisciplinarily; in particular, the Althusserian symptomatic reading as a 
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transdisciplinary reading. Here, Althusser is read back through the politics of the 
Sartrean concept of reading that he was writing against. 
 As noted above, with Guattari we reach the point at which transdisciplinarity 
becomes explicitly thematized in French thought, in part as a working practice, and in 
part as a reaction against the institutionalization of interdisciplinary. Here, Andrew 
Goffey translates into English, for the first time, a late text in which the 
transdisciplinary problematic is both embraced and relocated within a generalized 
ontology of transversal relations. Goffey’s Introduction contextualizes the piece 
within the overall trajectory of Guattari’s thought. The question of what happens in 
French thought to the interrogation of disciplinarity through the critique of 
structuralism after Guattari is a moot point. One answer is Bruno Latour (whose work, 
as we have seen, Nowotny et al draw upon in Re-thininkg Science): first, with Actor-
Network-Theory and now An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2013) – his 
dramatologically collective project, which returns to an engagement with explicitly 
philosophical discourses. Here, Éric Alliez traces the transdisciplinary threads from 
Guattari through to Latour, throwing a Guattarian light on Latour’s new disciplinary 
incarnation. With Latour’s Inquiry, the transdisciplinary legacy of structuralist anti-
humanism finds its terminal point in a return to a new philosophy. In the context of 
Serres’s Leibnizian attempt to construct its ultimate systematicity, from which we set 
out, this may also be seen as the closing of a certain circle.   
 The final three essays, making up Part 2 of this volume, on ‘Transdisciplines’, 
present case studies of the emergence of discrete transdisciplinary fields in the 1980s 
and 1990s, which became proto-disciplines – Feminist Theory, Gender Studies and 
Psychosocial Studies – out of politically based critical reproblematizations of existing 
fields and ‘dead’ or outmoded concepts, respectively. Stella Sandford takes up the 
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constitution of the transdisciplinary concept of gender in the context of the 
antagonistic relationship of the dominant disciplinary form of philosophy to feminist 
theory as such. Disciplinary philosophy resists feminist theory, it is argued, because it 
cannot incorporate the necessarily transdisciplinary content of its concepts, which 
derive from its relationship to feminism as a political practice. In a strict disciplinary 
sense, ‘feminist philosophy’ thus appears as a ‘contradiction in terms’.  
 In a complementary investigation, Tuija Pulkkinen examines the distinctive 
structure of Gender Studies as a dialectically ‘transdisciplinary discipline’ produced 
by a particular form of political intervention into academic discourse. Gender Studies, 
it is argued, ‘is not the study of gender so much as an intervention into the prevailing 
understanding of gender’. The specificity of Gender Studies here, as an intervention, 
is compared with Derrida’s attempt to intervene into the institution of philosophy 
through the creation of a transdisciplinary Collège International de Philosophie – an 
episode to which Cunningham also refers. 
 Lisa Baraitser takes Judith Butler away from the familiar role of her work in 
the queering of Gender Studies, to consider the The Psychic Life of Power (1997) as a 
foundational text in the ‘transdiscipline’ of Psychosocial Studies. The basic 
mechanism of transdisciplinarization identified here is not reproblematization via 
politicization, but ‘temporal drag’: the reproblematizing recovery of ‘out of date’ 
concepts that continue to impose themselves on us, to the point of requiring the 
construction of a whole new field of operation for them to work within.  
 Transdisciplinary problematics, then – multiple and diverse, but each 
programmatically translating the critique of disciplinary limitations into new traversal 




Foucault on academic disciplines and disciplinarity 
Given the overwhelming influence of Foucault on the politics of the anti- and de-
disciplinarizing imaginary, especially in the USA – no one else has so effectively 
reasserted the primary meaning of discipline as constraint – it is useful to take a quick 
look at Foucault’s own writings on specifically academic disciplines. 
 Foucault is both an inspiration to, and a red herring within, the literature on 
disciplinarity. He is an inspiration, first, because of the radical indeterminacy of the 
disciplinary character of his own writings. From the standpoint of the established 
division of disciplinary labours, he appears as in some sense a historian– a historian of 
‘systems of thought’, he insisted, rather than 'ideas'; yet his history is no more the 
history of ‘the historians’ than his history of thought partakes of the history of 
philosophy. (Indeed, his rejection of the term 'history of ideas' was intended as a 
polemical rejection of the hegemony of the history of philosophy within the history of 
ideas in France.) Nor is Foucault a 'philosopher' in a disciplinary sense. He appears a 
historian to philosophers, and as a philosopher (or at least, a ‘theorist’) to 
conventional historians (Takacs, 2004; Castel, 1994). As such he has become for 
some an exemplar of inter-disciplinarity: a Colossas striding 'between two 
disciplines’. For others, his writings have been received as a general theoretical 
resource, available to each and every discipline in the humanities and social sciences 
(see, for example, Goldstein, 1984; Ball, 1990). 
 Complementing this image of exemplary interdisciplinarity is a sense of 
Foucault as being radically and explicitly anti-disciplinary in his academic politics, 
broadly derived from his construction of the concept of disciplinary power in 
Discipline and Punish – although a literal translation of Surveiller et punir would, of 
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course, have moderated this reading, since it is the question of visibility which is 
largely at stake there, in the study of the prison as a disciplinary machine, rather than 
disciplinarity per se. Nonetheless, discipline appears in this imaginary very much as 
the opposite of freedom. A discipline is an exercise of ‘disciplinary power’: ‘the art of 
correct training’ (Foucault, 1977: 170). It is an almost exclusive emphasis on a 
negative sense of disciplinary power as a technique of domination that is the red 
herring in the debate about Foucault and academic disciplines.20  
 However, this is all too superficial a reception, since it both ignores Foucault's 
own writing on specifically academic disciplines, and it identifies the disciplinary 
power of the 'strict' discipline of the prison with that of academic disciplines – on the 
basis of the use of the same term – via the analogy between the prison and the school; 
and analogy that is convincing on its own terms (especially today with the virtual 
milititarization of schools as academies in the UK), but that is a rather different issue. 
 In brief, with regard to Foucault's writings on academic disciplines of the late 
1960s in The Order of Things, The Archeology of Knowledge and The Order of 
Discourse, two things stand out. First, the construction of the concept of the episteme 
in The Order of Things appears primarily as exemplary of both the transdisciplinary – 
rather than inter-disciplinary – thrust of the structuralist project and the danger of the 
restitution of a meta-disciplinarity that it contains (see Balibar’s contribution to this 
volume, below). Indeed that danger is balanced there, rhetorically at least, by an 
oscillation with the alternative danger of a complete dissolution of disciplines into 
positivism. This epistemologically negative view of disciplines is reinforced by the 
priority of discourses over disciplines in The Archeology of Knowledge, and the 
exclusion there of disciplines from the set of relations between knowledge, science 
and formalization. In short, in The Archeology of Knowledge, transdisciplinary savoir 
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trumps disciplinary connaissance. In the section entitled ‘'Positivities, disciplines, 
sciences', in the chapter ‘Science and Knowledges’, Foucault writes: 
If one calls ‘disciplines’ groups of statements that borrow their organization 
from scientific models, which tend to coherence and demonstrativity, which 
are accepted, institutionalized, transmitted and sometimes taught as sciences, 
could one not say that archeology describes disciplines that are not really 
sciences, while epistemology describes sciences that have been formed on the 
basis of (or in spite of) existing disciplines?  
 To these questions I can reply in the negative. Archeology does not 
study disciplines. At most, such disciplines may, in their manifest deployment, 
serve as starting points for the description of positivities; but they do not fix its 
limits: they do not impose definitive divisions upon it; at the end of the 
analysis they do not reemerge in the same state in which they entered it; one 
cannot establish a bi-univocal relation between established disciplines and 
discursive formations. (Foucault, 1972: 178–9) 
 
In a return to his previous discussion of the psychiatric discipline in Madness and 
Civilization, he continues: ‘The discursive formation whose existence was mapped by 
the psychiatric discipline was not coextensive with it, far from it: it went well beyond 
the boundaries of psychiatry. […] positivities are not merely the doublets of 
established disciplines.’ (Foucault, 1972: 179–80). He then proceeds to ignore 
disciplines altogether in his articulation of the history of the relations between 
knowledge, science and formalization, in epistemes, conceived as discursive 
organizations of the elements of postivities.  
 Second, however, this negative picture is at least partially countered, or 
counter-balanced, in The Order of Discourse, his inaugural lecture at the Collège de 
France, where disciplines appear as one of the three principles of internal constraint 
upon discourses (the other two are the commentary principle and the author 
principle), which are at the same time ‘infinite resources for the creation of 
discourses’ (Foucault, 1981a: 61). The discipline principle is ‘a principle which is 
itself relative and mobile; which permits construction, but within narrow confines’: 
 35 
a discipline is defined by domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of 
propositions considered to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of 
techniques and instruments: all this constitutes a sort of anonymous system at 
the disposal of anyone who wants to or is able to use it, without their meaning 
or validity being linked to the one who happened to be their inventor. […] 
what is supposed at the outset is… the requisites for the construction of new 
statements. For there to be a discipline, there must be the possibility of 
formulating new popositions ad infinitum. (59) 
 
 Still further: in order to be part of a discipline, a proposition has to be able to 
be inscribed on a certain type of theoretical horizon. … Within its limits, each 
discipline recognizes true and false propositions, but it pushes back a whole 
teratology of knowledge beyond its margins…. In short, a proposition must 
fulfil complex and heavy requirements to be able to belong to the grouping of 
a discipline; before it can be called true or false, it must be ‘in the true’, as 
Cauguilhem would say. […] It is always possible to speak the truth in the 
space of a wild exteriority, but one is ‘in the true’ only be obeying the rules of 
a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of one’s discourses. 
(60–61) 
 
The ‘positive and multiplicatory role’ of disciplines is thus dependent on their 
‘restrictive and constraining function’ (61). There is a mutual dependence of negative 
and positive functions here that will come to characterize Foucault’s later conception 
of power, but similarly to that conception, it is wholly misleading to focus on the 
negative functions alone. There is thus little textual ground for attributing to Foucault 
a one-sidedly anti-disciplinary stance with regard to academic disciplines, although he 
does undertake a quasi-structuralist epistemological critique of them, in the direction 
of a genrically discursive transdisciplinarity than nonetheless still runs through them. 
Inter-, multi- and trans-disciplinarity all depend upon the reproduction and 
development of the disciplines they stand between, multiply or cross. 
 Finally, in the late move from an emphasis on techniques of domination to 
technologies of the self – but without Foucault himself explicitly noting the 
significance of the change for his concept of disciplines – the relationship of these 
technologies to truth (‘self technology implies a set of truth obligations’, Foucault, 
1981b: 177) effectively recodes disciplines as techniques of the self, which for the 
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first time place them in a relationship not only to creativity (the creativity of 
constraint), but to freedom. The philosophical use of this freedom is conceived by late 
Foucault in terms of the notion of problemization – specifically, 'critical 
reproblematization' (Schwartz, 1999). It is through this concept that Foucault’s work 
can be used to problematize the very concept of a problem that we find in the 
hegemonic, technocratic conception of transdisciplinarity. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 The conventional attribution for the coining of the term’transdisciplinarity’ is the 
first OECD International Conference on Interdisciplinary Research and Education, in 
Nice in 1970, the proceedings of which were published as Apostel et al, 1972 
(Thompson Klein, 2004: 515; Barry and Born, 2013: 8). Jantsch (1972), Lichnerowicz 
(1972) and Piaget (1972) all use the term in their papers there. Its first published 
instance, though, seems to be in the earlier version of Jantsch’s paper that appeared in 
Policy Sciences in 1970.  
2 ‘Transdisciplinarity and the Humanities: Problems, Methods, Histories, Concepts’ 
2011–2013 (AHRC 914469): 
http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/research/crmep/projects/transdisciplinarity/. Part I of the 
current volume present results from the ‘French Theory’ side of the investigation – 
following in the wake of a more conceptually orientated pilot: Balibar et al, 2011.  A 
future publication, on Romantic Transdisciplinary, will constitute its ‘German’ 
partner.  
3 The first version of this argument was outlined in Osborne, 2009.  
4 ‘Whatever the strengths of the concept of transdisciplinarity, in view of the 
continuing disputes both over its provenance and over its kinship with or difference 
from interdisciplinarity… we attempt neither to define nor to arbitrate between the 
two terms. Instead, we take ‘interdisciplinarity’ to be a generic expression, while 
recognising that interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity are indigenous concepts 
with variable significance in particular circumstances.’ (Barry and Born, 2013a: 9–
10.) Nothing further is heard of it thereafter.  
5 In German universities the main ‘social unit’ was always, and to some extent 
remains, ‘the individual chair and its associated structures – the seminars and the 
research institute or laboratory. Each unit supporting an apprenticeship grouping… 
composed of advanced students and assistants but not other chairholders’. (Reese, 
1995: 545, quoted in Post, 1999: 752 n. 21.) It was only when the German model of 
the research university was exported to the USA at the end of the 19th century, that the 
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department became the main ‘social unit’, as it remains today, despite all of the 
institutional upheavals in teaching and research since the 1960s. Meanwhile, the 
American research university is itself now increasingly being adopted, globally, as an 
institutional model.  
6 For the genealogy of the concept of research, see Clark, 2006. 
7 Regarding the institutional power of departments, despite their constraining role on 
the development of research, one might note the extraordinary timidity of the 
concluding recommendation of Immanuel Wallerstein's Gulbenkian Report, Open the 
Social Sciences: that it should become more regularly possible for an academic’s 
tenure to be split across two departments – Wallerstein, 1996. 
8 See the Appendix to this article, ‘Foucault on Academic Disciplines’, ??–??, below. 
9 However, it should be noted that – like the broader interest in interdisciplinarity – 
this remains largely a policy aspiration in this context. Despite the encouragement of 
the funding body, an empirical study of interdisciplinarity in projects in the Fifth 
Framework programme of the EU found ‘disappointingly few projects that seemed… 
to be clearly interdisciplinary’ (Bruce et al, 2004: 457). 
10 For the argument that the five main components of Mode 2 Knowledge Production 
(of which transdisciplinarity is one) need to be disaggregrated and considered 
separately, see Hessels and Lente, 2008. 
11 On the Bachelardian concept of the problematic, central to both the philosophy and 
practices of the sciences in France in the second half of the 20th century – for which 
the problem both precedes and structures the subject and object of thought and, in its 
clarified form, is ‘the active summit of research’ (Bachelard, 2012: 30) – see 
Maniglier, 2012b. On Foucault’s concept of problematization, see Castel, 1994 and 
Schwartz, 1998; and below, ??–??. 
12 See Spivak, 2003, for the broader context of the struggles over the transformation 
of Comparative Literature and Areas Studies in the USA, from their Cold War 
formation into the fluid complexities of a more polycentric, yet economically 
capitalistically unified, world ‘after-1989’. (In the USA, the Cold War formation of 
Area Studies, effectively functioned as the spatial – that is, geo-political – correlate to 
the temporal science of history; reduced in its turn to modernization theory.) Spivak’s 
Derridean background is, of course, in no way coincidental to the central role she has 
played in these debates. 
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 Translation is a type of travel, and it might be thought that, in so far as it is a 
book about travel between disciplines, Bal, 2002 is a text about transdisciplinary 
concepts. However, oddly, Bal understands transdisciplinarity to involve the 
presupposition of ‘immutable rigidity, a travelling without changing’ (35): precisely 
the opposite, in fact, of everything that is most productive about the term. Her 
example is narrative (10–11), which she thus, again oddly, thinks of as immutable in 
this way. The book traces movements of various concepts across disciplines, and is 
thus effectively about transdisciplinarity, in this regard; or at least, it contains 
materials for reflection on transdisciplinarity. But its piecemeal empirical approach to 
theory forgoes any theoretical reflection of that kind. 
13 In Thompson Klein’s wide-ranging typological work on the differences between 
inter-, multi- and transdiscipinarity, the humanities fit firmly into her model of 
interdisciplinarity. (Thompson Klein, 2005.) 
14 See Stuart Hall’s remarks on the ‘uselessness’ of British philosophy to the emergent 
practice of cultural studies in Hall, 1997: 26–7. 
15 Interestingly, in his essay on ‘Science Studies and the Humanities’, Biagioli sees 
the future of the humanities largely within Science Studies itself. (Biagioli, 2009.) 
16 For a detailed account of this process, and its difference from Horkheimer’s later , 
better known (1937) model of ‘critical theory’, see Dubiel, 1985.  
17 The three topics through which Dubiel focuses his analysis of this research agenda 
are: ‘1. The transformation of the relationship between philosophy and the positive 
sciences. 2. The dialectic of the internal and external generation of problems. 3. The 
trasnformation of the relationship between science and society.’ (Dubiel, 1985: 119–
20) 
18 Cf. the role of philosophy in cultural theory outlined in Osborne, 2000. See also 
Osborne 2011b. 
19 Cf. Hacking, 2004: 194. Interestingly, Hacking also took Leibniz as his role model. 
However, he conceives his own practice as a deviant practice of disciplinarity: 
‘applying my discipline in different directions’. 
20 The most thoughtful pieces on this topic are Chandler, 2009 and Wellerby, 2009. 
